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Abstract
In collapse theories of quantum mechanics, there exist quantum ob-
servers who are observers being in a superposition of different result
branches. In this paper, I analyze the mental state of a quantum ob-
server. First, I argue that the mental state of a quantum observer is
not the usual state of recording one of the results in the superposition,
but it is definite. Second, I argue that the mental state of a quantum
observer is determined by both the amplitudes and relative phases of
the result branches of the superposition, and the mental content is
composed of every result. Third, I argue that there are new mental
properties which are lack for classical observers and determined by the
amplitude and relative phase. In particular, the mental property de-
termined by the amplitude may be a certain property of vividness of
the mental content; the bigger the amplitude of a result branch, the
more vivid the result is in the whole mental content. Finally, I argue
that the new experience of a quantum observer, which violates quan-
tum mechanics, implies that consciousness is not physically reducible
or emergent but fundamental in collapse theories.
Consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms. For con-
sciousness is absolutely fundamental. It cannot be accounted for in
terms of anything else. — Erwin Schro¨dinger
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1 Who is a quantum observer?
In standard quantum mechanics, it is postulated that when a quantum sys-
tem is measured by a measuring device or an observer, its wave function
no longer follows the linear Schro¨dinger equation, but instantaneously col-
lapses to one of the wave functions that correspond to definite measurement
results. As a consequence, there are no observers who are physically in a
quantum superposition of brain states with different records. This conclu-
sion is also true in Bohm’s and Everett’s theories. In these theories, although
the wave function never collapses and the post-measurement state is a su-
perposition of different result branches, the brain state of an observer after
the measurement is definite, recording only one result.1
However, such strange observers exist in other quantum theories in which
the mental state of an observer is determined by the whole superposition
she is physically in, such as the collapse theories of quantum mechanics
(Ghirardi 2016). Due to the imperfectness of wave-function collapse, the
post-measurement state of an observer is a superposition of brain states
with different records, although the modulus squared of the amplitude of
one state is close to one in general. This leads to the well-known tails
problem (Lewis 1995; Albert and Loewer 1996). Besides, since the collapse
time of a single superposed state is an essentially random variable, whose
value can range between zero and infinity, such observers always exist after
certain measurements with a tiny probability. Finally, there may exist small
brain observers, who are not like us and can be in a superposition of brain
states most of the time.
I call these observers quantum observers. In other words, quantum ob-
servers are observers who are in a quantum superposition of brain states
with different records. The question is: what is it like to be a quantum ob-
server?2 In this paper, I will try to answer this question by analyzing how
the mental state of a quantum observer is determined by her wave function.
2 What the mental state of a quantum observer is
not
Suppose there is an ideal x-spin observer M who measures the x-spin of a
spin-l/2 system S without disturbing it. If the initial state is one where M is
ready to make a measurement and S is in an x-spin up eigenstate, then after
1The reason is that the brain state and the mental state of the observer are determined
not by the whole superposition of different result branches, but by another definite hidden
variable or one definite result branch of the superposition. Thus there are only classical
observers in Bohm’s and Everett’s theories.
2A similar question has been asked in the bare theory (Albert 1992, p.124; Barrett
1999). The previous analysis of the answer to the question is based on the eigenvalue-
eigenstate link in standard quantum mechanics. In this paper, I will give a new analysis.
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the measurement S will be still in the x-spin up state, and M will physically
record the x-spin up result and her corresponding mental state is the state of
recording x-spin up. Similarly, if S is initially in an x-spin down eigenstate,
then after the measurement S will be still in the x-spin down state, and M
will physically record the x-spin down result and her corresponding mental
state is the state of recording x-spin down. The evolution of the physical
state of the composite system for these two cases can be written as:
|up〉S |ready〉M → |up〉S |up〉M , (1)
|down〉S |ready〉M → |down〉S |down〉M . (2)
Then if M begins in a ready-to-make-a-measurement state and S begins in
a superposition of x-spin up and x-spin down, the post-measurement state
may be
α |up〉S |up〉M + β |down〉S |down〉M . (3)
in collapse theories, where α and β are not zero and they satisfy the nor-
malization condition |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. The question, then, is: what is the
mental state of the quantum observer M? In this section, I will first argue
that the mental state of M is not the usual state of recording either x-spin
up or x-spin down.
When α = β, the argument is simple. By symmetry of the two terms
in the superposition, the superposed state cannot describe the observer M
recording either x-spin up or x-spin down. If the superposition describes the
observer M recording x-spin up or x-spin down, then since the two terms
in the superposition has exactly the same status, the superposition will also
describe the observer M recording x-spin down or x-spin up. Since x-spin
up and x-spin down are two distinct records, this leads to a contradiction.
When α 6= β, this symmetry argument is not valid, and it seems possible
that the observer M may have the mental state of recording x-spin up or
recording x-spin down for some values of α and β. For example, one may
assume that the observer M has the mental state of recording x-spin up
when |α| > |β| and she has the mental state of recording x-spin down when
|α| < |β| (Maudlin 1995). However, this assumption is not consistent with
the general requirement of continuity for the psychophysical connection.
The requirement says that when the physical state changes continuously the
corresponding mental state also changes continuously. This means that when
the amplitude of each branch of the superposition (3) changes continuously,
the mental state of the observer M also changes continuously. But according
to the above assumption, when the amplitudes of α and β change from
|α| > |β| to |α| < |β|, during which the change of each amplitude may be
infinitesimal, the mental state of the observer M changes from the state of
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recording x-spin up to the state of recording x-spin down, and the change
is not infinitesimal.
In the following, I will give a more general argument for the case of α 6= β
based on a basic postulate about the superposition of two identical mental
states. The postulate says that an observer being in a superposition of two
physical states with identical mental states also has the same mental state.
In short, a superposition of two identical mental states is the same mental
state.
Assume the observer M in the superposition (3) or α |up〉S |up〉M +
β |down〉S |down〉M has a mental state of recording x-spin up or record-
ing x-spin down. Then consider the following two superpositions (I omit the
normalization):
(α |up〉S |up〉M + β |down〉S |down〉M )− α |up〉S |up〉M (4)
and
(α |up〉S |up〉M + β |down〉S |down〉M )− β |down〉S |down〉M . (5)
If the observer M in the superposition α |up〉S |up〉M + β |down〉S |down〉M
has a mental state of recording x-spin up, then accoding to the above postu-
late, the first superposition will correspond to the mental state of recording
x-spin up. But the first superposition is just the state |down〉S |down〉M ,
which corresponds to the mental state of recording x-spin down. This leads
to a contradiction. Similarly, the assumption that the observer M in the su-
perposition α |up〉S |up〉M+β |down〉S |down〉M has a mental state of record-
ing x-spin down will also lead to a contradiction for the second superposition.
Therefore, the initial assumption is wrong, namely the mental state of
the observer M being in the superposition (3) is not the usual state of
recording x-spin up or recording x-spin down.
3 The mental state of a quantum observer is def-
inite
It is usually thought that an observer in a superposition of different result
states has no definite mental state (when the wave function of a system is
a complete description of the system). In this section, I will argue that this
view is wrong.
First of all, it seems that this view comes from the standard way of
thinking. According to the eigenvalue-eigenstate link in standard quantum
mechanics, a superposition of different result states, such as (3), is not a state
where the observer has a definite record, either x-spin up or x-spin down or
another one. However, since the eigenvalue-eigenstate link is widely argued
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to be problematic and is also invalid in collapse theories, this view is very
likely to be wrong.
Next, it can be argued with the help of psychophysical supervenience that
this view is wrong. If there are properties of definiteness and indefiniteness
for a mental state, then by the principle of psychophysical supervenience
each property should supervene on a corresponding physical property. As
we know, the observer being in each result state has a definite mental state,
and thus her mental state has the property of definiteness. Then every result
state will have the same physical property on which the mental property of
definiteness supervenes. Then by the superposition principle for all physical
properties, the observer being in a superposition of result states will also have
this physical property. This then means that the mental state of the observer
being in such a superposition will also have the property of definiteness, and
thus she will also have a definite mental state.
On the other hand, if there are no properties of definiteness and indef-
initeness for a mental state, then it will be meaningless and also wrong to
say that the observer being in a superposition of result states has no definite
mental state. Instead, such a quantum obsever will also have the normal
mental state as the observer being in a result state has.
Finally, it may be worth noting that there may exist another kind of un-
derstanding of the indefiniteness of the mental state of a quantum observer,
that is, that an observer being in a superposition of two result states has
no definite mental state means that one time her mental state is the state
corresponding to one result state and the other time her mental state is the
state corresponding to the other result state. But in this case, the mental
state is not (uniquely) determined by or does not supervene on the whole
superposition, since the same superposition may correspond to two different
mental states.
4 What is it like to be a quantum observer?
I have argued that a quantum observer has no usual mental state of a clas-
sical observer, recording only one result such as x-spin up or x-spin down,
while she still has a definite mental state. In this section, I will further
analyze what the mental state of a quantum observer really is.
Consider a quantum observer M being in the following superposition:
α |1〉P |1〉M + β |2〉P |2〉M , (6)
where |1〉P and |2〉P are the states of a pointer being centered in positions x1
and x2, respectively, |1〉M and |2〉M are the physical states of the observer
M who observes the pointer being in positions x1 and x2, respectively, and α
and β, which are not zero, satisfy the normalization condition |α|2 + |β|2 =
1. According to the previous analysis, the mental state of this quantum
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observer is definite, but it is neither the state of observing the pointer being
in position x1 nor the state of observing the pointer being in position x2.
Then, what does M observe when she is physically in the above superposed
state?
Since the mental state of M is determined by the superposition she is
physically in, what M observes may depend on both the amplitude and
the phase of each branch of the superposition. Indeed, it can be readily
seen from a few special cases that the mental state of M depends on the
amplitude of each branch of the superposition she is physically in. When
|α|2=1 and |β|2=0, M will observe the pointer being only in position x1.
When |α|2=0 and |β|2=1, M will observe the pointer being only in position
x2. When |α|2 = |β|2 = 1/2, M ’s mental state is not the usual state of
observing the pointer being in position x1 or position x2. However, it is not
so easy to see whether the mental state of M also depends on the phase
of each branch of the superposition she is physically in. Note that strictly
speaking, the phase here denotes the relative phase of the two branches of
the superposition, since an overall phase has no physical meaning, and two
wave functions with only a difference of overall phase in fact represents the
same physical state.
In the final analysis, we need to determine whether the relationship be-
tween the mental state and the wave function is an one-to-one correspon-
dence, that is, whether different values of α/β correspond to different mental
states. In order to answer this quesiton, I will resort again to the basic pos-
tulate about the superposition of two identical mental states, which says
that an observer in a superposition of two physical states with identical
mental states also has the same mental state.
Consider the observer M being in another superposition:
α
′ |1〉P |1〉M + β
′ |2〉P |2〉M , (7)
where |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 and α′/β′ 6= α/β, which means that this superposed
state and the superposed state (6) describe different physical states. Assume
when being in these two different states, the mental states of M are the same.
According to the above postulate, when M is in a superposition of these
two states, her mental state is the same as one of them in the superposition.
Consider the following two superpositions:
α
′
α
(α |1〉P |1〉M + β |2〉P |2〉M )− (α
′ |1〉P |1〉M + β
′ |2〉P |2〉M ) (8)
and
β
′
β
(α |1〉P |1〉M + β |2〉P |2〉M )− (α
′ |1〉P |1〉M + β
′ |2〉P |2〉M ). (9)
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Then when M is in these two superpositions her mental states will be
the same. However, since the two superpositions are just |2〉P |2〉M and
|1〉P |1〉M , respectively, they correspond to different mental states. This
leads to a contradiction. Therefore, based on the above postulate we obtain
the following result, namely that when a quantum observer is in two differ-
ent physical states her mental states are also different. Concretely speaking,
when a quantum observer M is in the superposition (6), her mental states
are different for different values of α/β.
It seems that this result is not beyond expectations. But it may have
a few interesting inferences. The first one is that the mental state of M
being in the superposition (6) cannot be a state whose content is empty,
containing neither the content of observing the pointer being in position
x1 nor the content of observing the pointer being in position x2. For if
this is not true, then two different superpositions with different values of
α/β will correspond to the same mental state, which contradicts the above
result. Note that since the coefficients α and β are related to the content of
observing the pointer being in position x1 and the content of observing the
pointer being in position x2, if the mental state of M is an empty state, the
state will be the same for different values of α/β.
Now there are only two possibilities. The first one is that the mental
content of the observer M being in the superposition (6) contains both the
content of observing the pointer being in position x1 and the content of
observing the pointer being in position x2 for any (non-zero) value of α/β.
The second one is that the mental content of the observer M being in the
superposition (6) contains only the content of observing the pointer being in
position x1 or the content of observing the pointer being in position x2 for
some values of α/β. For example, the observer M has a mental content of
recording x-spin up when |α| > |β| and she has a mental content of recording
x-spin down when |α| < |β| (Maudlin 1995).3
Another inference of the above result is that the second possibility can be
excluded. The reason is that if the mental content of the observerM contains
only the content corresponding to one branch in the superposition, then the
mental state of M will not depend on the relative phase of the two branches,
since the existence of the mental property corresponding to the relative
phase requires the existence of the two mental contents corresponding to
the two branches. But this contradicts the above result, according to which
the mental state of M depends on the value of α/β, which means that it
depends not only on the amplitudes of the two branches of the superposition,
but also on the relative phase of the two branches.
Now I will analyze how the mental state of the observer M is determined
3Note that the mental state is composed of the mental content and other mental prop-
erties. Thus, for example, the mental state of the observer M , who has a mental content
of recording x-spin up, may be not the same as the usual mental state of recording x-spin
up (cf. my analysis in the second section).
7
by the amplitudes and relative phase of the two branches of the superposition
she is physically in. As argued above, the mental content of the observer
M being in the superposition (6) contains both the content of observing the
pointer being in position x1 and the content of observing the pointer being
in position x2, and how these two parts constitute the whole mental content
of the observer M is determined by the values of α and β.
It seems relatively easy to conjecture how the modulus squared of the
amplitude determines the mental state of the observer M . Let us see a few
special cases. When |α|2 = 1, the mental content of the observer M is the
content of observing the pointer being in position x1. In other words, the
content of observing the pointer being in position x1 is most vividly visible.
When |α|2 = 0, the mental content of the observer M does not contain
the content of observing the pointer being in position x1. In other words,
the content of observing the pointer being in position x1 is not visible at
all. Similarly, when |β|2 = 0, the content of observing the pointer being
in position x2 is not visible to the observer M . While when |β|2 = 1, the
content of observing the pointer being in position x2 is most vividly visible
to the observer M .
Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the mental property de-
termined by the modulus squared of the amplitude is a certain property of
visibility or vividness of the mental content. For example, when |α|2 is close
to one the part of the mental content of M observing the pointer being in
position x1 is the most vivid, while when |α|2 is close to zero, the part of
the mental content of M observing the pointer being in position x1 is the
least vivid. In particular, when |α|2 = |β|2 = 1/2, the part of the mental
content of M observing the pointer being in position x1 and the part of the
mental content of M observing the pointer being in position x2 have the
same intermediate vividness.
On the other hand, it seems more difficult to conjecture the nature of
the mental property determined by the relative phase. At the physical level,
the relative phase of two braches in a superposition is a certain comparison
between the two branches, and its physical effect can be detected by the in-
terference of the two branches. Then, at the mental level, it seems that the
mental property determined by the relative phase should be also a certain
comparison between the parts of the mental content corrsponding to the two
branches.4 Anyway, no matter what the mental properties determined by
the amplitudes and relative phases of the branches of a quanutm superposi-
tion are, they are new mental properties which do not exist in the classical
4Here it is worth noting that since the mental property determined by the relative
phase can hardly be imagined, it seems also possible that such mental property does not
exist. Then the basic postulate about the superposition of two identical mental states,
which says that an observer in a superposition of two physical states with identical mental
states also has the same mental state, will be wrong, and different wave functions will not
always correspond to different mental states.
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world and we probably have never experienced.
To sum up, I have argued that the mental state of a quantum observer is
determined by both the amplitudes and relative phases of the result branches
of the superposition she is physically in, and the mental content is composed
of every result. Moreover, the modulus squared of the amplitude of each
result branch may determine the vividness of the part of the mental content
containing the result.
5 Consciousness is fundamental
In this section, I will argue that the above results may have implications
for the nature of consciousness in collapse theories. Concretely speaking,
since the laws are different at the physical level and at the mental level,
the mental state cannot be reduced to the physical state, and in particular,
consciousness is not physically reducible or emergent but fundamental.
A direct argument is based on an analysis of the superposition principle.
Consider again the observer M observing the position of a pointer which is
in a position superposition:
(α |1〉P + β |2〉P ) |0〉M → α |1〉P |1〉M + β |2〉P |2〉M , (10)
where |0〉M is the physical state of the observer M before the observation,
and |1〉M and |2〉M are the physical states of the observerM who observes the
pointer being in positions x1 and x2, respectively. If the mental properties
are reducible to the physical properties, then the corresponding evolution of
the mental state of the observer M will be
(α |1〉P + β |2〉P ) |0〉M |m0〉M → α |1〉P |1〉M |m1〉M + β |2〉P |2〉M |m2〉M ,
(11)
where |m0〉M is the mental state of the observer M before the observation,
and |m1〉M and |m2〉M are her mental states of observing the pointer being
in positions x1 and x2, respectively. But according to the results obtained
in previous sections, the evolution of the mental state of M is
(α |1〉S + β |2〉S) |0〉M |m0〉M → (α |1〉P |1〉M + β |2〉P |2〉M ) |m12〉M , (12)
where |m12〉M is the mental state of the observer M after the observation.
No matter how to understand the “superposition” of two mental states in
the r.h.s of (11), it is not the mental state |m12〉M in (12) (see below for
more discussion).
By this analysis, it can be seen that the laws governing the evolution
of the mental state is different from the laws governing the evolution of the
physical state; the evolution of the wave function satisfies the superposition
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principle, while the evolution of the mental state does not. In other words,
the physical properties are superposed, while the mental properties are not.
The mental violation of quantum mechanics can also be seen from other
aspects, e.g. measuring an unknown wave function. In quantum mechanics,
an unknown quantum state or wave function cannot be measured. If the
mental is reducible to the physical, then this means that an observer cannot
measure an unknown measured state, such as α |1〉P+β |2〉P . In other words,
the observer cannot obtain any information about the coefficients α and β.5
But, according to the results obtained in previous sections, an observer can
obtain the information about the coefficients α and β; the mental state of the
observer is determined by the values of these coefficients. The information
can be used to further distinguish two non-orthogonal states with certainty
(at the mental level). Note that although protective measurements can
measure the wave function of a single quantum system, they need to know
some information about the measured system beforehand. By comparison, a
quantum observer can obtain information about an unknown wave function
directly at the mental level.
Here a question appears: which mental property, if any, makes a quan-
tum observer have the extrodinary ability to violate quantum mechanics?
It is arguable that the mental property is consciousness or more specifi-
cally phenomenal consciousness. The outcome of each observation of an
observer is her conscious experience, whose content contains the record of
observation, such as seeing the pointer being in a position. Then, if the con-
tent contains more information than that permitted by quantum mechanics,
then it seems natural to assume that the consciousness property enables the
observer to obtain the information. By violating the fundamental laws of
physics such as the superposition principle, consciousness is not only (phys-
ically) irreducible but also not emergent; an emergent property should also
follow the fundamental laws of physics. This means that consciousness is a
fundamental property.
6 Further discussion
It seems surprising that in quantum theories where the mental state of an
observer is determined by the whole superposition she is physically in, such
as collapse theories, consciousness (or another mental property) cannot be
physically reducible or emergent but be fundamental.In this final section, I
will further analyze the origin of this interesting result.
If mental properties are physically reducible or emergent, then what is
5For example, the “superposition” of two mental states |m1〉M and |m2〉M , the r.h.s
of (11), which is a result of the mental being reducible to the physical, contains only
information about the positions x1 and x2, and it does not contain information about the
coefficients α and β.
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the prediction of quantum mechanics for the mental state of a quantum ob-
server? As we know, quantum mechanics requires that two non-orthogonal
states cannot be distinguished with certainty. If mental properties are re-
ducible to physical properties and thus follow the same laws as the phys-
ical properties, then this means that the mental state of a quantum ob-
server being in a superposition like |1〉P |1〉M + |2〉P |2〉M must be either
|m1〉M or |m2〉M ; otherwise the observer will be able to distinguish the two
non-orthogonal states |1〉P |1〉M + |2〉P |2〉M and |1〉P |1〉M or |2〉P |2〉M with
certainty. On the other hand, as I have argued before, if assuming the
mental state of an observer is determined by the whole superposition she
is physically in, then by symmetry of the two terms in the superposition
|1〉P |1〉M + |2〉P |2〉M , the superposition cannot describe the observer being
in the mental state |m1〉M or |m2〉M .
Furthermore, the mental state of a quantum observer being in the super-
position |1〉P |1〉M + |2〉P |2〉M cannot be always |m1〉M or |m2〉M ; otherwise
the observer will be also able to distinguish the two non-orthogonal states
|1〉P |1〉M + |2〉P |2〉M and |1〉P |1〉M or |2〉P |2〉M with certainty. For exam-
ple, if the mental state of a quantum observer being in the superposition
|1〉P |1〉M + |2〉P |2〉M is always |m1〉M , then the observer will be able to dis-
tinguish the two non-orthogonal states |1〉P |1〉M + |2〉P |2〉M and |2〉P |2〉M
with certainty. This still contradicts quantum mechanics. On the other
hand, that the mental state of a quantum observer being in the superposi-
tion |1〉P |1〉M + |2〉P |2〉M is sometimes |m1〉M and sometimes |m2〉M will
be inconsistent with the assumption that the mental state of an observer is
(uniquely) determined by her wave function, or in other words, it will violate
the principle of psychophysical supervenience (on the wave function).
Therefore, it is the assumption that the mental state of an observer
is determined by her wave function that leads to the incompatibility be-
tween quantum mechanics and the assumption that mental properties are
physically reducible or emergent. By comparison, if the mental state of an
observer is not determined by her wave function, but determined by another
hidden variable as in Bohm’s theoy or a certain definite branch of her wave
function as in the many-worlds theory, then quantum mechanics and this
asumption may be compatible.
The next question is: is it necessary to assume the mental state of an
observer is determined by her wave function? The answer to this question is
related to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. According to
the standard formulation given by Maudlin (1995), the measurement prob-
lem originates from the incompatibility of the following three claims: (1).
the wave function of a physical system is a complete description of the sys-
tem; (2). the wave function always evolves in accord with the Schro¨dinger
equation; and (3). each measurement has a definite result. Correspondingly,
there are three major approaches to avoiding the incompatibility and solving
the measurement problem by denying one of these claims, which are Bohm’s
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theory, Everett’s theory, and collapse theories. Bohm’s and Everett’s theo-
ries deny the claims (1) and (3), respectively, while collapse theoriesc deny
the claim (2).
In addition, and more importantly, in these theories, the measurement
results are represented by different physical states, and correspondingly, the
mental states of an observer are determined by these physical states. In
Bohm’s and Everett’s theories, the measurement result is represented, and
correspondingly, the mental state of an observer is determined, not by the
(post-measurement) wave function, but by another definite hidden variable
or one definite result branch of the wave function. This permits no existence
of quanutm observers and thus avoids the issues discussed above. But in
collapse theories such as the GRW theory, the measurement result is repre-
sented, and correspondingly, the mental state of an observer is determined,
directly by the wave function. This will introduce quantum observers and
the relevant issues discussed above.
Although it is still unknown which solution to the measurement problem
is right or in the right direction, collapse theories has been widely regarded
as a major option. In these theories, it is a basic assumption that the mental
state of an observer is determined by her wave function. Note that in collapse
theories it is not required that the wave function of a physical system is a
complete description of the system, but it is indeed required that the wave
function determines the measurement result, as well as the mental state of
an observer; otherwise it would be not necessary to introduce the collapse
of the wave function. For example, if the mental state of an observer being
in a superposition like |1〉P |1〉M + |2〉P |2〉M is already |m1〉M or |m2〉M ,
then there will be no need to introduce wave-function collapse to solve the
measurement problem.
There is still the last and deeper question: can consciousness or another
mental property have the extrodinary ability to violate quantum mechanics?
I must admit that the answer is still not available. If collapse theories is
the right solution to the measurement problem, then it seems that a certain
mental property such as consciousness must violate quantum mechanics.
Since quantum mechanics does not consider this property as a fundamental
property, it is not impossible that the property violates quantum mechan-
ics. On the other hand, if no mental property violates quantum mechanics,
then collapse theories may be not a promising solution to the measurement
problem. In the final analysis, we need more empirical evidence to answer
the above question. I will discuss this issue in future work.
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